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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE-THE WALL OF SEPARATION CRUMBLES. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.
Ct. 1997 (1997).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Agostini v. Felton,' the United States Supreme Court ruled that
allowing public employees to provide services to students on the premises of
sectarian schools did not violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.2
The decision continued the Court's trend toward a more liberal view of the
separation of church and state requirements.3 Aside from the constitutional
issues, the Agostini decision also had procedural implications. The petitioners
employed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5),4 a device never previously
used, to get their case before the Supreme Court.5
Part II of this note examines the facts related to the Agostini decision. Part
Ed reviews the history of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and
related decisions. After analyzing the reasoning of the Court in Part IV, this
note delves into the significance and future implications of the Agostini ruling
in Part V.
II. FACTS
Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 19656 to provide federal funding to aid students in meeting state perfor-
mance standards.7 The federal government distributes funding for Title I
programs through the states to be administered by local education agencies.'
Local education agencies must provide services through Title I programs to
1. 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997).
2. See id. at 2016 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I.). The Establishment Clause provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... U U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
3. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV.
L. REv. 963, 989 (1998).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). Rule 60(b)(5) states that a party may be granted relief from
a final judgment or order if"it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application." Id.
5. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006. See also Daniel Wise, City's Novel Strategy to
Vacate Order: 12-Year-Old Ban in Special Education Case Before Supreme Court Tomorrow,
N.Y.L.J., April 14, 1997, at 1.
6. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301(d) (1994). Services available through Title I include: college
and career awareness, work programs with local businesses, counseling, and transitional
programs for pre-school students. See 20 U.S.C. § 6315(c)(1)(E) (1994).
8. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311-6312 (1994).
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students in both public and sectarian schools.9 To avoid violating the
Establishment Clause,' added restrictions apply when Title I funds are used to
provide educational services to students in private, specifically sectarian
schools."
In 1966, the state of New York first distributed Title I funds to the New
York City Board of Education.'2 After two methods of providing Title I
services to sectarian schools failed, the Board formulated an extensive plan
for providing services to students in these schools.' 4 Under this plan, public
employees provided Title I services on sectarian school property during school
hours. 5 The plan required public employees to follow rigid standards,' 6 and
supervisors made monthly visits to monitor compliance with the plan
guidelines.
17
Six taxpayers brought suit against the Board, stating that the plan under
which the Board provided Title I services to students in sectarian schools
violated the Establishment Clause.'" The District Court for the Eastern District
of New York granted summary judgment for the Board.' 9 On appeal, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and
9. See 20 U.S.C. § 6312(c)(1)(f (1994).
10. See supra note 2 for the language of the Establishment Clause.
11. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6314, 6321(a)(2), (c)(1) (1994). Title I does not allow school-wide
services to be provided in sectarian schools; sectarian school employees are not permitted to
provide Title I instruction; and Title I services may not be used as a replacement for the services
provided by the sectarian school. See id.
12. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2004.
13. See id. Under the Board's first plan, the Board transported sectarian school students
to public school premises to receive services in an after-school program. See id. "[T]his
enterprise was largely unsuccessful. Attendance was poor, teachers and children were tired, and
parents were concerned for the safety of their children." Id. (citation omitted). The Board's
second plan, providing the services on the premises of sectarian schools during after-school
hours, also proved unsuccessful. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. Employees were informed of the "secular purpose of Title I" and were told
that
(i) they were employees of the Board and accountable only to their public school
supervisors; (ii) they had exclusive responsibility for selecting students for the Title
I program and could teach only those children who met the eligibility criteria for
Title I; (iii) their materials and equipment would only be used in the Title I program;
(iv) they could not engage in team-teaching or other cooperative instructional
activities with private school teachers; and (v) they could not introduce any religious
matter into their teaching or become involved in any way with the religious
activities of the private schools.
Id. (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,406 (1985)).
17. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005 (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 407).
18. See id. Several parents of sectarian school students who received services under Title
I joined as codefendants through intervention. See id.
19. See id.
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found the Board's Title I program unconstitutional.2° The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the Second Circuit's decision.2
On remand, the district court permanently enjoined the Board from allowing
public employees to provide Title I services on sectarian school property.22
Following this decision, the Board restructured its Title I program.23 Under the
new plan, the Board offered Title I services to sectarian students on public
school premises, on leased premises, in mobile instructional units, 24 and
through computer-aided instruction.25
The Board, joined by parents of sectarian school students, sought relief
from the permanent injunction concerning the Title I program under Rule
60(b)(5), 6 arguing that Establishment Clause law had changed.27 Although
acknowledging a shift in Establishment Clause law, both the district court and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit28 denied the
petitioners' motion.29 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari30 and
reversed the Second Circuit, holding that New York City's Title I program,
whereby services are provided on the premises of sectarian schools, comports
with the Establishment Clause.3'
20. See Felton v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 72 (2d Cir. 1984), affd,
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
21. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402. The United States Supreme Court upheld the Second
Circuit in a five-to-four decision. See id.
22. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005.
23. See id.
24. See Brief for Petitioner at 14, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (No. 96-552,
96-553). The mobile instruction units used in the Title I programs were buses that had been
converted into classrooms and parked on public streets near sectarian school sites. An
expensive method, these vehicles were leased at a cost of $83,729,440 during the first eight
years of use. See id.
25. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005.
26. See id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)). See supra note 4 quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(5).
27. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006-07. The petitioners argued that the Aguilar decision
had been "undermined by subsequent Establishment Clause decisions." Id.
28. Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 787 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
29. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006. The petitioners asserted that the "decisional law
[had] changed to make legal what the [injunction] was designed to prevent." Id. The district
court and the court of appeals denied the motion "because Aguilar's demise had 'not yet
occurred."' Id. (quoting Application to Petition for Certiorari in 96-553, p. A20).
30. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
31. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006, 2016. The Supreme Court reversed the Second




This section first addresses the Constitutional history and background of
the Establishment Clause. Second, it considers the early Establishment Clause
decisions in which the Court took a strict approach to separation of church and
state. Third, this section examines the test the Court formulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman32 to analyze cases falling under the Establishment Clause. Fourth,
it considers the Establishment Clause cases following Lemon that concerned
aid to private schools. Finally, this section addresses the Court's recent
decisions in which the Court took an accommodation approach to religion.
A. Constitutional Background of the Establishment Clause
The first portion of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
is known as the Establishment Clause.33 It should come as no surprise that the
Establishment Clause is the subject of much litigation and legal confusion, for
those individuals who were the primary influences behind the Constitution and
Bill of Rights often had opposing views on the separation of church and state.
34
Subsequently, it is difficult, if not impossible to formulate the Constitutional
framers' intent.35 Most would agree, however, that the Establishment Clause
at least meant that the government lacked the authority to legislate on the
subject of religion or in matters concerning religion.36
The changes that have occurred in both religion and education since the
eighteenth century add to the uncertainty over the precise meaning of the
Establishment Clause.37 The modem religious landscape of America is much
more diverse than in the country's early history.38 Furthermore, the framers
could not possibly have imagined all the educational options that exist today.39
It is unlikely the framers envisioned the church and state conflicts that have
arisen in recent years, specifically those concerning aid to sectarian schools.4
0
Subsequently, the Supreme Court must wade through a sea of uncertainty in its
analysis of the Establishment Clause.
32. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
33. U.S. CONST. amend I. See supra note 2 for the language of the Establishment Clause.
34. See JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 3 (1995).
35. See id. Congress kept no records of the debate over the Bill of Rights. See id.
36. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 89 (1986). Constitutional
history "proves that the framers of the [E]stablishment [C]lause meant to make explicit a point
on which the entire nation agreed: The United States had no power to legislate on the subject
of religion." Id.
37. See CHOPER, supra note 34, at 4-5.
38. See CHOPER, supra note 34, at 5.
39. See CHOPER, supra note 34, at 5.
40. See CHOPER, supra note 34, at 5.
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B. A Strict Approach to Separation of Church and State
Justice Black authored the first Establishment Clause opinion concerning
public aid to sectarian schools, Everson v. Board of Education .4' Everson, a
school district taxpayer, brought suit challenging the Board of Education's
authorization of reimbursement to parents for costs incurred in sending their
children to school on public transportation.42 The Board of Ewing Township
in New Jersey paid transportation costs to parents of students in public as well
as Catholic parochial schools.43 Although upholding the reimbursement
program, the Court took a strict separationist view." The Court characterized
the program not as support to sectarian schools, 45 but rather as a general welfare
program benefitting all of New Jersey's citizens. 46 The majority stated that
New Jersey could not provide tax monies toward the support of sectarian
schools and comply with the Establishment Clause, but here the Court likened
41. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Black, writing for the majority, put forth his definition of
the Establishment Clause:
The 'establishment of a religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither the
state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between Church and State.'
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
42. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3-4.
43. See id. at 3.
44. See id. at 18. "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable." Id.
45. See id. at 16. Justice Black did note, however, that "it is undoubtedly true that
children are helped to get to church schools." Id. at 17. "There is even a possibility that some
of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled to pay
their children's bus fares out of their own pockets ... ." Id.
46. See id. at 16. One scholar asserted:
The clear implication of this is that a law denying bus transportation for parochial
school pupils while granting it to those attending public schools would violate at
least three constitutional prohibitions: it would prefer nonbelievers in public
schools over believers in parochial schools . . . ; it would make attendance at
parochial schools economically impossible to children of low-income parents whose
religious conscience impelled such attendance and .... [it] would deny to parents
of parochial school pupils the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
LEO PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 23-24 (1984).
1998]
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the reimbursement program to police and firefighter services provided to
students in sectarian schools. Accordingly, the Court embarked on a vessel
of strict separation, while at the same time allowing the marginally acceptable
reimbursement program to continue.4
Board of Education v. Allen49 further demonstrated the Court's continuing
reluctance to prohibit programs benefitting sectarian school students that did
not aid the schools directly. In Allen, a New York statute requiring school
boards to acquire and loan textbooks to students in public and private,
including sectarian, schools was at issue.5 The Court, holding that the law did
not violate the Establishment Clause, noted the struggle that arises when a
questionable program is analyzed for inconsistencies with the First Amend-
ment." The majority applied the test used in School District of Abington v.
Schempp,53 which involved determining the purpose and primary effect of the
governmental enactment.5 4 Relying on Everson, the Court held that the New
York law had a general secular purpose of enhancing educational opportunities
for children.55 The Court asserted that the only financial benefit was an indirect
one, bestowed on the parents and students, not the sectarian schools. 56 The
Court reasoned that since the textbooks were only used for secular and not
religious instruction, the governmental aid neither advanced nor inhibited
religion, thus satisfying the test outlined in Schempp.57 Once again, although
operating from a strict separationist view, the Court allowed the questionable
program to survive, unhampered by the Establishment Clause.58
47. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18.
48. See Lisa N. Seidman, Note, Religious Music in the Public Schools: Music to
Establishment Clause Ears?, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 466, 472 (1997). "Ironically, the decision
credited with first advancing the principle of strict separation actually permitted the
questionable program." Id. (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
49. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
50. See id. at 243-44.
51. Seeid.at239.
52. See id. at 242. "[T]he line between state neutrality to religion and state support of
religion is not easy to locate." Id.
53. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding a statute and school board regulation requiring
mandatory Bible reading in public schools unconstitutional).
54. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-44.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 245-46.
58. See id. at 248.
818 [Vol. 20
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C. The Lemon Test: A Framework for Establishment Clause Decisions
. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Burger Court formally adopted a three-prong
test for use in the analysis of Establishment Clause cases. 9 Under this test,
governmental action would be deemed constitutional if it satisfied each of the
following requirements: first, the action must have a secular purpose; second,
the action must have a principal or primary effect that does not advance or
inhibit religion; and third, the action must not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion.'c In Lemon, the Court applied this test to
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes.6' Both states provided financial
support to sectarian schools through reimbursement of teacher salaries and
school materials in secular subjects.6 2 As a restriction on receipt of this aid,
teachers who obtained support could teach only secular subjects.63 Basing its
findings on legislative intent, the Court found that the purpose of the statutes
was not to advance religion, but rather to further secular education.' Thus, the
programs did not violate the first prong of the Lemon test.65 The Court found
it unnecessary to address the second prong of the test, because the result of the
relationships created under the statute constituted an excessive entanglement
of government and religion, violating the third prong.' The Court questioned
whether the teachers would be able to remain neutral even when teaching
secular subjects.67 The Court noted that even if teachers were able to remain
neutral, the supervision and monitoring necessary to ensure their neutrality
59. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 606-07.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 608, 610.
64. See id. at 613.
65. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
66. See id. at 613-14.
67. See id. at 618. The Court noted:
We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools will be guilty of
bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and
the First Amendment. We simply recognize that a dedicated religious person,
teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its
tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral.
1998]
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would also result in an entanglement. 68 Therefore, the Court invalidated the
statutes as a violation of the Establishment Clause.69
The Lemon test, while not necessarily creating a change in the outcome
of Establishment Clause decisions, did affect the process by which these cases
were decided.70 Unfortunately, all too often, the test first adopted in Lemon has
offered more confusion than help.71 Some have questioned whether it has any
usefulness at all.72 Regardless, the Court continued to apply, at least in form,
the analysis of Lemon.73
D. Post-Lemon Decisions
In Mueller v. Allen,74 the Court applied the Lemon test and upheld a
Minnesota statute that allowed parents of students in public and sectarian
schools to deduct school expenses.75 The Court reasoned that the statute passed
the first prong of the Lemon test because it had a secular legislative purpose of
68. See id. at 619. As one commentator has noted, this analysis created a dilemma.
Therefore, if the government were to help fund any subjects in these [sectarian]
schools, the effect would aid religion unless public officials monitored the situation
to see to it that those courses were not infused with religious doctrine. But if public
officials did engage in adequate surveillance . . . there would be excessive
entanglement between government and religion, the image being government spies
regularly or periodically sitting in the classes conducted in parochial schools.
Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 5, 6 (1987).
69. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
70. See Sharon 1. Block, Note & Comment, The Establishment Clause in Public Schools:
A Model for Future Analysis, 79 GEO. L.J. 121, 128 (1990).
The impact of the Lemon decision was not felt in the outcome of [E]stablishment
[C]lause cases, but rather in the analytic framework of the opinions. After Lemon,
instead of simply declaring on which side of the wall separating church and state the
government action fell, the Court analyzed the action within the structure of the
tripartite test.
Id.
71. See CHOPER, supra note 34, at 175. "It is fair to say that application of the Court's
three-part Lemon test has produced a conceptual disaster area, generating ad hoc judgments that
are incapable of being reconciled on any principled basis." CHOPER, supra note 34, at 175.
72. See CHURCH AND STATE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 115
(Philip B. Kurland ed., 1975). With the Lemon test "[tihe Court ... put itself in an . . .
awkward position. If the concept of 'excessive entanglement' is to be taken seriously, it raises
more questions than it answers. Its broad and amorphous nature makes predictability an
impossibility .. " Id.
73. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ba.l, 473 U.S. 373 (1985);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
74. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
75. See id. at 391. These expenses included costs of tuition, textbooks, and transportation
of students to public and sectarian schools. See id.
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ensuring that the citizens of Minnesota received a good education.7 6 Under the
second prong, the statute neither advanced nor inhibited religion because
Minnesota had numerous other tax deductions, and the deduction at issue
applied not only to parents of students in sectarian schools, but also to parents
of students in public schools." The Court also asserted that since parents
received the benefit rather than the sectarian schools, the program neither
advanced nor inhibited religion.78
The Minnesota statute did not create an excessive entanglement between
government and religion, passing the third Lemon prong.79 The Court
determined that pervasive monitoring would not be required.80  The only
surveillance necessary to ensure that no entanglement occurred would be the
examination of textbooks to decide whether they were eligible for a
deduction.8' Thus, with the Mueller decision, financial assistance to sectarian
schools received a boost.
8 2
In the summer of 1985, the Supreme Court rudely awakened those who
hoped the Mueller decision signaled the judicial embracing of public aid to
sectarian schools.83 On July 1, 1985, the Court decided the companion cases
76. See id. at 395. The Court also noted that by educating a host of students, private
schools "relieve public schools of a correspondingly great burden--to the benefit of all
taxpayers." Id.
77. See id. at 396-97.
78. See id. at 399. Justice Rehnquist characterized the aid as merely an "attenuated
financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual parents, that
eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at issue." Id. at
400.
79. See id. at 403.
80. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403.
81. See id. "State officials must disallow deductions taken from 'instructional books and
materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of which
is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship."' Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22)
(1982)).
82. See Choper, supra note 68, at 11.
The major conclusion to be drawn from Mueller v. Allen is that it opened a large
window for aid to parochial schools. After Lemon and its progeny, states only had
narrow opportunities for providing financial assistance to church related schools.
After Mueller, the issue has become simply a matter of form.
Choper, supra note 68, at 11.
Another scholar noted that the Mueller decision "appeared to signal the beginning of a
retreat by the Supreme Court from its post-Lemon decisions that had prohibited most forms of
direct or indirect aid to parochial schools." GREGG IVERS, LOWERING THE WALL: RELIGION
AND THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 1980s 42 (1991).




of School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball" and Aguilar v. Felton." These two
cases marked an important limitation on public aid to sectarian schools.
The Shared Time program, attended by sectarian school students on
sectarian school premises, was at issue in Ball.86 Public school teachers taught
these remedial or enrichment classes, and public schools financed the
program. 7 In holding the Shared Time program unconstitutional, the Court
applied the Lemon test. 8  The Court had no problem finding the program
satisfied the first prong, that it had a secular purpose.89 The Court invalidated
the Shared Time program, however, because it failed the second prong of the
Lemon test.90 The Court asserted that the program could advance religion in
three different ways.9" First, the public school instructors could, either
intentionally or unintentionally, instruct the students in certain religious beliefs
or practices.92 Second, students and the general public could perceive a union
between government and religion under which the federal government
sanctioned state support of religion.93 Third, the government could provide a
subsidy to the sectarian school by assisting sectarian schools under this
program. 94 Thus, the Court concluded the Shared Time program violated the
Establishment Clause.95 The Court found it unnecessary to consider the third
prong of the Lemon test.
96
In the companion case of Aguilar v. Felton, the Court held New York
City's Title I program unconstitutional. 97 The Title I program provided
remedial services to students in sectarian schools through public employees
who taught on sectarian school premises. 98 The Board required the public
employees to follow strict guidelines, and the Board closely monitored the
public employees to ensure the separation of church and state. 99
84. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
85. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
86. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 375.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 382-83.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 385. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
second prong of Lemon.
91. See id.
92. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 385.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 397.
96. See id. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the third prong
of Lemon.
97. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414.
98. See id. at 405-07.
99. See id. See supra note 16 for a discussion of the requirements of public employees
providing services in sectarian schools.
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The Court only analyzed Aguilar using the third prong of the Lemon test,
and found that the program created an excessive entanglement between church
and state for two reasons.00 First, the Board provided the services in a
primarily sectarian environment.' Second, the monitoring required to guard
against public employees promoting religion created an entanglement.10 2 The
majority noted that the contact between the government and sectarian schools
required to implement the Title I program also created an impermissible
entanglement. 13
E. Accommodation - A Contemporary View
Less than a year after the Ball and Aguilar decisions, the Court handed
down its decision in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind.1 4 In Witters, the unanimous Court upheld a vocational educational
assistance program that provided funding to a blind student to attend a
Christian college and receive religious career training.' 05 In applying the first
prong of the Lemon test, the Court found a secular purpose for the pro-
gram-providing educational assistance to the visually handicapped.10 6 The
Court also concluded that the program did not have the effect of either
advancing or inhibiting religion, thereby successfully passing the second
prong. 10 7 The Court reasoned that the state gave the aid directly to the student,
who then decided which school would be the recipient.108  Therefore, the
student, not the government made the choice to support sectarian education,
and the choice was indirect. 9 The Court also noted that financial gain was not
100. Seeid. at412-13.
101. Seeid.at412.
102. See id. at 412-13. "This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian
schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of
excessive entanglement." Id. at 413.
103. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412-13. "Administrative personnel of the public and
parochial school systems must work together in resolving matters related to schedules,
classroom assignments, problems that arise in the implementation of the program, requests for
additional services, and the dissemination of information regarding the program." Id. at 413.
104. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
105. See id. at 489. Witters was "studying the Bible, ethics, speech, and church
administration in order to equip himself for a career as a pastor, missionary, or youth director."
Id. at 483.
106. See id. at 485-86.
107. See id. at 486.
108. See id. at 488. "Any aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows
to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private
choices of aid recipients." Id. at 487.
109. See id. One scholar noted the "analytical weakness" of this point. See Choper, supra
note 68, at 12. This distinction had been rejected "by Justice Marshall and the three members
of the Court who joined his persuasive dissent in Mueller just three years earlier." Choper,
1998]
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an incentive for a student to choose a sectarian education, because the benefit
was not available to only those students who chose to attend sectarian
schools."' With this decision the Court became more accepting of sectarian
aid, provided the government directly awarded the aid to the student and only
indirectly gave aid to the school."'
Just four years prior to the Agostini decision, the Court decided Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills School District. 2 In Zobrest, the Court relied heavily on
Mueller and Witters to find that a school district did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause by providing a sign language interpreter in a sectarian school." 3
This case involved a deaf child and his parents who asked a school district to
provide a sign language interpreter to assist the child in his classes at a Catholic
high school, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)."I4 The school district refused, stating such a provision violated the
Establishment Clause.' The Court held that the Establishment Clause did not
prevent a school district from providing a disabled child in a sectarian school
a sign language interpreter to assist his education." 6 The Court stated that the
government distributed aid neutrally under the program at issue, without regard
to the type of school the student attended." 7 Relying on the Mueller and
Witters decisions, the Court noted that the IDEA did not create any financial
incentive for a student to attend a sectarian school." 8 Because the IDEA did
not create a financial incentive, the mere presence of a sign-language
interpreter on the premises of a sectarian school was not the result of state
action. "19
The Court managed to distinguish Zobrest from Ball in two major ways.
First, the Court made a distinction between direct and indirect aid. 20 The
Court asserted that the sectarian school was not freed from an expense it would
supra note 68, at 12. "Justice Marshall also reasoned, contrary to his position in Mueller, that
the aid provided by the Washington program was available for expenditure in all schools...
" Choper, supra note 68, at 12.
110. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
111. See IVERS, supra note 82, at 45. "State legislatures looking to provide parochial
schools with meaningful financial subsidies may increasingly take this route in future
parochia[l] plans at the elementary and secondary school level." IVERS, supra note 82, at 45.
112. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
113. See id. at lO.
114. See id. at 3-4 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994)).
115. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
116. See id. at 13-14.
117. See id. at 10.
118. See id.
119. See id. A publicly-employed interpreter would only be present on a sectarian campus
because of a decision made by a parent, not the government. See id.
120. See id. at 12-13.
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ordinarily have undertaken, as in Ball.' Further, the main intended beneficia-
ries under the IDEA were handicapped children, not sectarian schools.
22
Therefore, the sectarian school was not receiving a direct subsidy from the
government.' Second, the Court distinguished the role of a sign language
interpreter from that of a teacher used in the Shared Time program in Ball.'24
An interpreter would merely interpret the subjects being taught to the disabled
child, without injecting any personal beliefs into the material.'
25
Neither the majority nor the dissent applied the Lemon test to reach their
conclusion. Perhaps Zobrest represented a new approach to analyzing cases
arising under the Establishment Clause. Certainly the Lemon test had its
critics, Supreme Court Justices among them. 126 Although the Zobrest case was
a victory for those who supported the accommodation of religion, lower courts
and Establishment Clause scholars were left to merely guess whether the
demise of Lemon had occurred and the ways and situations in which it should
still be applied.
127
V. REASONING OF THE COURT
This section will analyze the Court's determination that Rule 60(b)(5) was
applicable. Additionally, this section will outline the basis for the Court's
decision that a change in Establishment Clause law had occurred which
warranted the use of Rule 60(b)(5). This section will also examine the two
dissenting opinions written in Agostini.
A. Majority Opinion
In Agostini v. Felton,128 the United States Supreme Court held that a Title
I program that allowed public employees to provide services to students on the
premises of sectarian schools was valid under the Establishment Clause.129 The
Court first stated that a Rule 60(b)(5) motion would only be granted if a party
121. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
122. See id. at 12-13.
123. Seeid. at l2.
124. See id. at 13.
125. See id.
126. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-401
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated: "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little
children and school attorneys .... " Id. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14.
128. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
129. See id. at 2016.
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could prove a significant change in facts or law. 30 The Court then addressed
the three changes the Board argued justified relief in this instance. 3' The Court
dismissed the Board's first argument that the excessive costs incurred since
Aguilar constituted a significant factual change.132 The Court also rejected the
Board's second assertion that statements made by five Justices calling for a
reexamination of Aguilar established a significant legal change. 133 Therefore,
the Board would only be entitled to relief from the permanent injunction if the
Court agreed with the Board's third argument and found that Establishment
Clause law had undergone a significant evolution. 134
The Court began its analysis by discussing the four assumptions
established in Ball and Aguilar v. Felton,135 two landmark cases in Establish-
ment Clause law. 36 In both cases, the Court concluded that the methods by
which services were offered to students in sectarian schools were unconstitu-
tional because they advanced religion.
37
Essentially, the Ball Court's decision was grounded on four
assumptions. '38 First, the Court assumed that any public employee providing
services on the premises of a sectarian school would incorporate religion into
her work. 139 Second, the Court assumed that the mere presence of public
school employees on sectarian school property fostered a fusion of government
and religion.' 4 Third, the Court assumed that any public aid used to provide
educational services to sectarian schools advanced religion."4  A fourth
assumption originated from the Aguilar decision. 42 The Court assumed that
excessive government entanglement resulted from the extensive monitoring of
130. See id. at 2006. The Court stated that "it is appropriate to grant a Rule 60(b)(5) motion
when the party seeking relief from an injunction or consent decree can show 'a significant
change either in factual conditions or in law."' Id. (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1991)). See supra note 4 for the language of Rule 60(b)(5).
131. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006-07.
132. See id. at 2007. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Aguilar decision.
133. See id. at 2006-07. The Justices made the statements in Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (holding that a New York state law
allowing for the creation of a school district which includes only members of a specific
religious sect violated the Establishment Clause). The Court rejected this argument stating that
"[t]he views of five Justices that the case should be reconsidered or overruled cannot be said
to have effected a change in Establishment Clause law." Id. at 2007.
134. See id.
135. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
136. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2008,
137. See id. at 2010.
138. See id. at 2008-09 (citing Ball, 473 U.S. at 385, 388, 391).
139. See id. at 2008 (citing Ball, 473 U.S. at 388).
140. See id. at 2009 (citing Ball, 473 U.S. at 391).
141. See id. at 2009 (citing Ball, 473 U.S. at 385).
142. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2009-10 (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409).
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public employees on sectarian school premises that was necessary to safeguard
against any religious promotion. 143
The Court then analyzed its decisions subsequent to Aguilar to determine
whether the Court's four assumptions had been undermined, thereby creating
an evolution in Establishment Clause law.'" The Court noted that in Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills School District, 14 it rejected the first two assumptions
established in Ball.' Therefore, the Establishment Clause did not invalidate
the Board's Title I program simply because it mandated that public employees
provide services on sectarian school premises. 147 Additionally, the Court noted
it had departed from the third assumption that the Establishment Clause barred
all public aid to provide educational services to religious schools.'4 Discussing
the second assumption, the Court held that a symbolic union of government
and religion was not created merely by placing a public employee in a sectarian
school classroom. 149 According to the Court, the roles of an interpreter in
Zobrest and Title I instructor in Agostini were essentially identical. 5 ' Further,
both programs were offered only to those students that met the requirements
of the statute. 5' Since neutral criteria govern those persons eligible for Title
I aid, the Court reasoned that sectarian schools were neither preferred nor
dispreferred'5 The Court concluded that under the current interpretation of
Establishment Clause law, they no longer viewed the programs in Ball and
Aguilar as invalid. 5 3 This change, the abandonment of the four assumptions,
satisfied the requirements of Rule 60(b)(5)154 allowing court action, but the
Court still needed to jump the Establishment Clause hurdle.
143. See id. at 2009-10 (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409).
144. See id. at 2010.
145. 509 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1993). See supra notes 112-127 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Zobrest.
146. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the first two assumptions established in Ball.
147. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2012. The Court reasoned that "there is no reason to
presume that, simply because she enters a parochial school classroom, a full-time public
employee... will depart from her assigned duties... and embark on religious indoctrination
.... Id. The Court also noted that subsequent case law "implicitly repudiated" the
presumption that "an impermissible 'symbolic link' between government and religion" was
created by the presence of public employees in religious schools. Id. at 2011.
148. See id. (citing Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986)). See supra notes 104-11i and accompanying text for a discussion of Witters.
149. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2012.
150. See id. at 2012-13.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 2014.
153. See id. at 2012.
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). See supra note 4 for language of Rule 60(b)(5).
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After determining that Rule 60(b)(5) applied, the Court analyzed three
separate grounds to determine whether the Board's Title I program resulted in
excessive entanglement between church and state, thus violating the Establish-
ment Clause.1 55 First, the Aguilar Court found that the intense monitoring
required to ensure Title I instructors did not promote religion created excessive
government entanglement with religion. 156 Second, the administrative
cooperation between the sectarian schools and state officials necessary to
conduct the program created an excessive entanglement.157 Third, the Aguilar
Court feared political divisiveness would result in excessive entanglement. 158
The Agostini Court concluded that the final two considerations would exist
even when Title I services were offered on public school premises or in mobile
instructional units. 159 Since the Court abandoned its previous presumption that
public employees would inject religion into their work, it reasoned that
extensive monitoring of these employees was no longer necessary.16
Therefore, New York City's Title I program was not unconstitutional as a
violation of the Establishment Clause.16' Essentially, the Court's decision
rested on the third prong of Lemon.1
62
The Court then critiqued Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in which he
argued that the programs in Ball and Aguilar amounted to a subsidization of
the services that would ordinarily be offered by sectarian schools. 163 In order
to determine whether New York City's Title I program had the effect of
subsidizing religion, the Court examined the method by which students who
received Title I services were selected.'64 The Court held that the determination
of which New York City students would receive Title I services was made
155. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2015. The Court in Aguilar held that excessive
entanglement occurred based on three grounds. See id. (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413-414).
156. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2015.
157. See id.
158. See id. "The numerous judgments that must be made by agents of the city concern
matters that may be subtle and controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance to the
controlling denominations. As government agents must make these judgments, the dangers of
political divisiveness along religious lines increase." Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414.
159. SeeAgostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2015.
160. Seeid. at2015-16.
161. See id. at 2016.
162. See id. at 2015-16. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for discussion of the
third prong of Lemon.
163. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014. See infra notes 169-172 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Justice Souter's dissent.
164. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014. To receive Title I services, students must fall within
one of the categories outlined in 20 U.S.C. § 6315. 20 U.S.C. § 6315 (1994). Categories of
eligible students include those who are "economically disadvantaged, children with disabilities,
migrant children or limited English proficient children .... " 20 U.S.C. § 6315(b)(2)(A)(i)
(1994).
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using neutral guidelines.'65 The Court determined that under the Board's plan
the district provided services to students whom it deemed eligible without
regard to religion.t66
After reexamining post-Aguilar decisions, the Court found that New York
City's Title I program was valid under the Establishment Clause, overruling
Ball and Aguilar to the extent of their inconsistencies. 167 The Court concluded
that this instance, where there had been a substantial change in law, was
precisely the situation to which Rule 60(b)(5) applied and granted the Board's
motion. 168
B. Dissenting Opinions
In a three-part dissenting opinion,169 Justice Souter discussed what he
believed to be the Court's incorrect reading of the post-Aguilar Establishment
Clause decisions. 70 Suggesting that sectarian schools are less likely to benefit
if services are provided away from sectarian school premises, Justice Souter
argued for a minimal level of contact between church and state.' 7' Justice
Souter asserted that the safeguards provided in Ball and Aguilar were more
prudent than the Court's current view.
72
In a separate dissenting opinion, 73 Justice Ginsberg found fault with the
Court's use of Rule 60(b)(5). 174 Arguing that the Court's only determination
was whether the district court had abused its discretion in rejecting the motion,
165. SeeAgostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014.
166. See id. "[l]t is clear that Title I services are allocated on the basis of criteria that
neither favor nor disfavor religion .... The Board's program does not.., give aid recipients
any incentive to modify their religious beliefs or practices in order to obtain those services."
Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 200.10(b) (1996) and 20 U.S.C. § 6312(c)(1)(F) (1994)).
167. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2016. "The same considerations that justify this holding
require us to conclude that this carefully constrained program also cannot reasonably be viewed
as an endorsement of religion." Id.
168. See id. at 2017 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)). See supra note 4 for the language of
Rule 60(b)(5).
169. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2019 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens and Justice
Ginsberg joined in Justice Souter's dissent. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
joined in part. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
170. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). "In sum, if a line is to be drawn short of barring all
state aid to religious schools for teaching standard subjects, the Aguilar-Ball line was a sensible
one capable of principled adherence. It is no less sound, and no less necessary, today." Id. at
2022 (Souter, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 2022. (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 2026 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsberg was joined by Justice
Souter, Justice Stevens, and Justice Breyer. See id. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 2027 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)). See supra
note 4 for the language of Rule 60(b)(5).
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Justice Ginsberg asserted that at the time of the district court's decision,
Aguilar was still good law. 75 Since the district court was correct in its ruling,
Justice Ginsberg concluded that the Court misapplied Rule 60(b) in its haste to
rule on an Establishment Clause case. 176
V. SIGNIFICANCE
As a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Agostini,
local education agencies are now free to send public employees into sectarian
schools to offer Title I services to eligible students.'7 One of the most obvious
effects of this ruling will be a decrease in expenditures necessary to comply
with the Aguilar decision.78 The millions of dollars once needed to provide
the services at a neutral location or through computer-aided instruction at
sectarian schools may now be used exclusively on remediation for students. 1
79
The quality of instruction for eligible students is likely to increase, as both
students and teachers alike will have fewer distractions resulting from the
location of the mobile instructional units.1
80
Further, the Court's acceptance of the Agostini case by way of Rule
60(b)(5) is of special procedural significance. This unusual method of review
by the Supreme Court startled some in the legal community who feel it dispels
175. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2025-26 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 2028 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 2016.
178. See John A. Farrell, Court OK's Religious School Aid: Ruling Ends a 12- Year Ban
on Public Role, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24, 1997, at Al.
179. See Joan Biskupic & Laurie Goodstein, Church-State Divide Narrowed; Taxpayer-
Funded Teachers Allowed to Tutor in Parochial Schools, WASH. POST, June 24, 1997, at Al.
"Federal education officials said that not only was a poor environment for students who needed
help but [also] wasted millions of dollars that otherwise could have been spent on more direct
academic aid." Id. "[T]o honor the [C]ourt's earlier ruling and still provide Title I services,
New York had to spend almost $100 million in the last 12 years to lease special vans and buses
that were parked on public streets and used as classrooms for parochial school students."
Farrell, supra note 178, at Al.
180. See Case's Origin Mars School Decision, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, June 25,
1997, at A14.
[A]n Allentown teacher who taught pupils from the downtown Sacred Heart School
in a van parked on North Fourth Street tells of having to compete with rumbling
truck traffic and the screaming sirens of ambulances en route to nearby Sacred Heart
Hospital. And, there was a special stigma attached to 'going to the trailer.' Moving
these services into the school buildings will be better for the children.
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the finality usually accorded judgments.' The application of Rule 60(b)(5)
did appear unusual for a Court that is continually restricting its caseload.
8 2
More far-reaching than the practical ramifications of the Agostini decision
are the implications this ruling has in the area of school vouchers.1 13 Those
favoring the use of school vouchers urged that this decision implied constitu-
tionality of voucher programs.'8 4 Voucher supporters will most assuredly rely
on Agostini when crafting school voucher legislation. 85 Bob Chanin, counsel
for the National Education Association, maintained that the limited nature of
the ruling had no effect on vouchers. 8 6 Although supporting the Agostini
decision, President Clinton-is against vouchers and argued for a qualified ruling
in the case that left no doors open for supporters of vouchers.1
8 7
181. See Daniel Wise, City's Novel Strategy to Vacate Order: 12-Year Ban in Special
Education Case Before Supreme Court Tomorrow, N.Y.L.J., April 14, 1997, at 1. "Professor
Donald L. Doernberg, who teaches federal courts at Pace University School of Law, said that
the opening up of a Rule 60(b) route carries with it a 'danger that Yogi Berra's maxim that "it's
not over until it's over" will be raised to new heights."' Id.
182. See Wise, supra note 5, at 1. "At a time when Congress has passed laws to conserve
the Court's scarce resources by limiting direct appeals... approval of the Rule 60(b) approach
would, instead, 'add to the [C]ourt's burden."' Wise, supra note 5, at I (quoting Stanley Geller,
the attorney who defended the Aguilar decision).
183. See Daniel Wise, Parochial School Teaching May Be Paid Be Fed'l Funds, N.Y.L.J.,
June 24, 1997, at 1.
School choice theorists seek[] to enhance parents' ability to select schools most
appropriate for their children. The device favored for reaching this result is the
school voucher. In a typical voucher plan, the state would first deliver vouchers to
parents. Parents could then submit the voucher to whichever school they wished
their child to attend. In turn, schools would be reimbursed by the state for the value
of the vouchers each school accumulated. Advocates believe that school choice,
facilitated through school voucher legislation, can revitalize America's schools.
Eric Nasstrom, School Vouchers in Minnesota: Confronting the Walls Separating Church and
State, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1066, 1066-67 (1996).
184. See Wise, supra note 183, at 1. General counsel of the U.S. Catholic Conference,
Mark E. Chopko stated that "the Court has provided states with 'a blueprint' for the adoption
of vouchers and other forms of aid for parochial students which can withstand constitutional
scrutiny." Id. "Advocates of tax aid to sectarian private schools claim that Agostini is a green
light for voucher programs .... Edd Doer, A Bad Week in June (Supreme Court Strikes Down
Several Laws Involving Religion and Ethics), HUMANIST, Sept. 19, 1997, at 37. "Chip Mellor,
president of the Institute for Justice.... believes the ruling provides ammunition for groups that
advocate school choice through the use of vouchers." Art Moore, Justices Void Ruling on
Remedial Teachers (Supreme Court Ruling on Public-Religious Schools Relations),
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, August !1, 1997, at 53.
185. See Biskupic & Goodstein, supra note 179, at Al. "[S]ome religious leaders
immediately declared that it could help their effort to get government to pay for vouchers that
could be used by parents to send their children to religious schools." Biskupic & Goodstein,
supra note 179, at Al.
186. See Moore, supra note 184, at 53.
187. See Moore, supra note 184, at 53.
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Finally, Agostini raises a crucial question in the area of Establishment
Clause law-what is the status of the three-prong Lemon test? For years, the
Lemon test was the yardstick by which the Court decided Establishment Clause
cases. 88 After a brief absence in Zobrest, the Court resurrected Lemon in the
Agostini decision. 89 Most scholars agree that the Court has loosened the reins
of strict separation in favor of a friendlier approach to religious accommoda-
tion.' 9 Arguably, the Court has fashioned the same test once used to restrict
religious interference with government into a test that underplays the
coexistence of government and religion. Some argue the Court's application
of the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test changed dramatically. 9'
Certainly, the Supreme Court's interpretation expanded the government's
power to funnel aid to sectarian schools. While maintaining the Lemon test, the
Court modified its application significantly in Agostini v. Felton. Whether the
Court was fashioning a trend toward other methods of government support for
sectarian schools or merely remedying one judicial inequity remains to be
determined.
Missy McJunkins
188. See Witters, 474 U.S. 481; Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402; Ball, 473 U.S. 373; Mueller, 463
U.S. 388; Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
189. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014-16.
190. See Wise, supra note 183, at 1. Notre Dame Law School Professor Douglas W. Kmiec
stated that "[tihe Court made very clear ... that it has moved from a test that emphasizes
exclusion to one that relies on accommodation; from a principle of separation to a principle of
non-discrimination." Wise, supra note 183, at I.
191. See Moore, supra note 184, at 53. Steven K. Green, the legal director of Americans
United, stated: "'This is the first case since 1971 where you have actually seen one of the
prongs collapse in a significant way.... That's going to have a major effect on the way that
people do church-state litigation in the future."' Moore, supra note 184, at 53.
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